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Self-concept and social integration
The Dutch case as an example
b e n  s p i e c ke r , jan  ste ute l  and
doret  de  ruyte r
Vrije University,Amsterdam,The Netherlands
ab st rac t
This article evaluates the credo ‘integration while maintaining one’s identity’ with
the help of psychological arguments. First, it explores the requirements of being
a good citizen in a liberal democracy. Following Rawls, we state that justice is the
cardinal liberal virtue and that this virtue includes having the disposition to respect
the rights of all citizens equally. It then investigates psychological theories about
identity and the relation between culture and identity. We focus on the distinc-
tion between collectivistic cultures and an interdependent self-concept on the one
hand and individualistic cultures and an independent self-concept on the other.
We come to the conclusion that the development into a good citizen of a liberal
democracy cannot be combined with the full preservation of an interdependent
self-concept. Further, we argue that the state has the right and the duty to offer
civic education to all pupils, even if this means that the development of an inter-
dependent self-concept of children from particular immigrant groups will be
hampered.
keyword s citizenship, immigrants, independent self-concept, liberal democracy
i nt roduc t i on
Th e  v i ew  that ethno-cultural minorities can integrate into liberal demo-
cratic societies without losing or endangering their own identity has domi-
nated discussions on integration and civic education for many years. This view
was supported by the belief that the public morality of such a society guaran-
tees the freedom of persons and groups to shape their own life according to
the self-subscribed private morality. Therefore, immigrants can adjust to these
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societies without harming their own identity. Recently, however, this view is
being questioned. Critics explicitly indicate that there can be tensions between
the demands of social integration and certain moral-religious orientations of
ethno-cultural minority groups. For example, the generally accepted norms
and values in society about the role and position of women and the admissi-
bility of forms of sexuality are hardly consonant with Islamic beliefs. And if
these minorities do not conceive of their religion as a private morality but
indeed as the only directive for the arrangement of public morality, then surely
this is a threat for a liberal democracy.
This article questions the credo ‘Integration while maintaining one’s
identity’ with the help of arguments that so far hardly play a role in the afore-
mentioned debate or at least are fully implicit. We take The Netherlands as an
example of the debate continuing within every liberal democracy that has
seen an influx of ethno-minority groups. We argue that integration into
Dutch society is hampered by a self-concept commonly found among particu-
lar ethno-cultural minorities, among which are the Moroccan- and Turkish-
Dutch. The way people understand their self is constitutive for their identity,
because a conception of the self offers a more or less implicit framework for
one’s thinking, feelings, motivations and actions. Our premise is that desirable
forms of integration are at odds with the self-conception of aforementioned
minority groups, and therefore the claim that integration while maintaining
one’s identity is possible for these groups is – though indeed ethically sym-
pathetic – psychologically unrealistic (Flanagan, 1991: 32). Before we begin,
we want to stress that our focus is on immigrant groups. We do not deny that
particular characteristics of their self-conception are also prevalent among
indigenous groups in The Netherlands, for instance the ultra-orthodox Protes-
tant communities, but their situation is different, if only because they have
been part of the Dutch liberal democracy for a long time and therefore are
affected by the mores of our society.
g ood  c i t i z e n sh i p
A rational discussion about the issue of whether or not integration while
maintaining one’s identity is possible presupposes that the parties are able and
willing to specify rather accurately the main components of this question.
First, they have to clarify their criteria for a successful integration, which
means that they have to elucidate their conception of good citizenship.
Second, they have to indicate which identity they have in mind and which
components are constitutive for this identity. Without these specifications it is
not quite possible to decide whether the dominant identity of a certain group
logically or psychologically is compatible with good citizenship in a society.
Theory and Research in Education 2 (2 )
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The relationship between good citizenship and a flourishing polity is instru-
mental; every political community needs citizens with qualities that are func-
tional for its continued existence and vitality. Such citizens are called ‘good’
and their qualities are seen as virtues, at least by the advocates of the society
concerned. For instance, if citizens in a liberal-democratic polity have not
acquired the supporting dispositions, liberal-democratic institutions cannot
function properly and might even disintegrate (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994:
352–3). In political philosophy these citizens are generally called ‘liberal’ and
their qualities are labelled ‘liberal virtues’. What are these virtues?
A liberal democracy is characterized by a coherent set of basic rights that
are, in general terms, covered by the first and major principle of justice of
John Rawls’ political philosophy. According to this principle, the so-called
principle of greatest equal liberty, ‘Each person has an equal claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is com-
patible with the same scheme for all’ (Rawls, 1993: 5). Its import is to protect
the freedom of every citizen by guaranteeing an appropriate package of the
same basic rights to all adult members of a society.1 The distinctive virtues of
the liberal citizen are precisely those characteristics that correspond to the
equal liberty principle. As this basic idea is a principle of justice, the corre-
sponding virtue, following Rawls, can be called the virtue of justice (a sense
of justice). In fact this politically cardinal virtue comprises all other political-
moral virtues that are constitutive of liberal citizenship. Important examples
of these qualities are tolerance towards different life styles, the disposition to
respect the equal rights of fellow citizens, a deeply rooted aversion against dis-
crimination and the typical democratic attitudes, among which are the incli-
nation to vote, to reach a compromise, to critically assess political decisions,
and a willingness to comply with laws and regulations that are the outcome
of democratic decision procedures (the so-called virtue of law-abidingness).
The bearer of these virtues is by definition willing and able to support and
uphold the liberal-democratic institutions. Therefore, all these qualities are of
instrumental value for a well-functioning polity that is organized according to
the equal liberty principle.2
The immigrant who is successfully integrated into Dutch society at least
has acquired the liberal virtues. The question is whether good liberal citizen-
ship is compatible with the self-conception of particular ethno-cultural
minority groups. Before answering this the question, the issue must be raised:
to what extent does (political) liberalism presupposes a metaphysical or onto-
logical conception of the self? After all, Sandel (1982) criticized Rawls for
conceiving the person in his Theory of Justice (1971) as an ‘unencumbered self ’,
that is, a self that has no attachments to and finds no shelter in cultural tra-
ditions. Rawls, according to Sandel, conceives the self as ‘given prior to its
Spiecker et al.: Self-concept and social integration
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ends, a pure subject of agency and possession, ultimately thin’ (Sandel, 1982:
94). If Sandel were right, our main question would be ontologically biased
from the very beginning. In our view,however,Rawls has convincingly argued
that his original position, including the veil of ignorance, is a devise of
representation that has no specific metaphysical implications concerning the
nature of the self (Rawls, 1993: 27; see also Kymlicka, 2002: 225).
s e l f - conc e p t s
Research in cultural psychology has shown that persons from different cultures
have different cognitions, emotions and motivations. Leading cultural psy-
chologists claim that psychological processes are not only influenced but
indeed also constituted by culture, and that, consequently, psychological pro-
cesses between cultures will vary greatly (Markus and Kitayama, 1991).
An important theoretical model to order and, if possible, explain the found
cross-cultural differences is the by now well-known dimension of collec-
tivism-individualism (Triandis, 1994). In individualistic cultures (the USA and
great parts of Western Europe) social behavior is determined by personal goals,
which seldom coincide with those of groups like the family or colleagues,
fellow believers or fellow citizens. In collectivist (Eastern-Asian and some
Mediterranean) cultures on the other hand, individual values and goals are
often subordinated to those of the group or the collective. Therefore, different
values and corresponding personal characteristics operate in these types of
societies:
For collectivists, social order, self-discipline, social recognition, humility, honoring
parents and elders, accepting my position in life, and preserving my public image. For
individualists, equality, freedom, an exciting life, a varied life, and enjoyment. (Triandis,
1990: 68, 1994)
Markus and Kitayama (1991, 1994) draw upon numerous empirical findings
to make a plausible case that persons in individualistic and collectivistic
cultures are characterized by quite different interpretations or construals of
the self. These self-concepts, typified by Markus and Kitayama (1991) as the
‘independent’ and the ‘interdependent self’, comprise normative tasks that are
imposed by the cultural environment.3 The independent self, which is
especially dominant in North America and Western Europe, is conceived as a
rather autonomous entity composed of a unique configuration of inner
qualities (traits, values, wants, needs, capacities, etc.). Accordingly, these charac-
teristics dominate in self-descriptions; actions, of oneself and of others, get
meaning and are explained by the internal repertoire of cognitive, affective
and conative dispositions. Equally, personal relations of this self often originate
Theory and Research in Education 2 (2 )
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from or come to an end on the basis of an (implicit) assessment of (assumed)
personal qualities. The interdependent self, which the authors situate not only
in Asian cultures, like the Japanese, but also in Latin American and Mediter-
ranean countries like Morocco (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 228) and Turkey
(Markus and Kitayama, 1994: 116), is constructed as part of a network of social
relations, as being essentially connected with the social context. Therefore, it
is not the personal traits that take a central place in self-descriptions, but the
relational and public aspects of the self, like the specific social position one
holds or the social roles one is supposed to perform. Behavior is not seen pri-
marily as regulated by or a manifestation of relatively stable inner qualities,
but as determined and explicable by the variable context of interpersonal
relations, social norms and reciprocal patterns of expectations.
According to Markus and Kitayama self-concepts are connected with
implicit, normative tasks that are characteristic for the corresponding culture
and that indicate which is the most preferred way of life. The tasks for the
independent self are to emancipate oneself from others, to discover and to
express one’s own inner qualities, and to strive for integrity, conceived as the
correspondence between what one thinks and feels on the one hand, and what
one says and does on the other. The cultural tasks attached to the interde-
pendent self encompass associating oneself with others, meeting social norms
and expectations, striving for interpersonal harmony and the well-being of
the group or community, as well as regulating and suppressing thoughts and
feelings in order to adapt effectively one’s behavior to the interpersonal
context. In this self-definition a person’s beliefs, qualities and skills are sub-
ordinated to interdependency: ‘Such voluntary control of the inner attributes
constitutes the core of becoming mature’ (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 227).
Heine et al.’s (1999) psychological theory about the way culture and self
become interwoven introduces the notion of ‘selfways’. Psychological pro-
cesses are formed by socialization in such a way that psychological and cultural
processes are fine tuned. The newborn develops into a person by incorporat-
ing the ‘self-ways’. These self-ways comprise both the beliefs about what it
means to be a ‘good’, ‘moral’ or ‘decent’ person and the social practices,
customs, everyday situations and institutions that preserve and further these
beliefs and practices. These beliefs are transmitted among others with the help
of narratives, metaphors, proverbs, icons and symbols, as well central texts (the
Constitution, the Koran and the Bible). ‘Selfways’, according to Heine et al.,
‘are not just different ways of construing the self – they are more generally
different ways of being, different ways of knowing, feeling, and acting’ (Heine
et al., 1999: 768).
Markus and Kitayama use a variety of examples to demonstrate that
the different cultures and correlated self-concepts influence individual
Spiecker et al.: Self-concept and social integration
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experiences, including cognitions, emotions and motivations of individuals.
Regarding emotions they indeed show rather convincingly that not only the
cause, expression, function and evaluation of emotions can be culture-specific,
but also that feelings themselves can vary in nature and intensity from culture
to culture. Sometimes words even refer to culture-specific feelings for which
there are no synonyms in other languages, like for example the Japanese term
‘amae’,which roughly stands for a feeling of hopeful expectation that the other
will show both concern and leniency towards you (Markus and Kitayama,
1991: 237, 239; see also Doi, 1973). They relate the independent and interde-
pendent self with two groups of emotions, which they term respectively,‘ego-
focused’ and ‘other-focused’ (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 235–9; Kitayama et al.,
1995). The function of the first group of emotions, which primarily refers to
the inner qualities of the person herself, is mainly to preserve and to promote
the independence and autonomy of the individual, whereas the second group,
which primarily concerns other persons, principally serves to confirm and
preserve the construction of the self as an interdependent entity.We can illus-
trate this distinction with a brief characterization of the feelings of shame and
the related feelings of self-respect.
Although by definition shame and self-respect imply a particular evaluation
or assessment of one’s own behavior, and therefore at first blush are ego-
focused, two different forms of these emotions can be distinguished that are
characteristic for respectively collectivist and individualistic cultures (Taylor,
1985). A person with an interdependent self-concept particularly feels
ashamed when she realizes she has failed those who are so to speak part of
her self-definition. She will feel ashamed when she realizes that in the eyes of
the others she has not met the expectations of the collective, as a consequence
of which the relationships with and possibly between the group members
might be damaged. The community as a whole might be disgraced or dis-
honored because of her failing and this belief will also undermine her self-
respect. Forms of shame and self-respect that are other-focused have the
function to keep, restore or strengthen the mutual dependency between and
the solidarity of the community members. The independent self on the other
hand feels ashamed if she acknowledges she has not met the ideals she con-
siders directive for herself. The person experiences a ‘blow to her self-esteem’
because she realizes that, measured by her own standards, she, to a certain
extent or fully, misses particular personal qualities like courage, loyalty, honesty
and strength of character. The feelings of shame of the independent self are
not necessarily connected to a perceived failure in other people’s eyes; she can
feel ashamed about something particularistic. These feelings often lead to the
intention to improve oneself, to be more faithful to one’s ideals, or to accept
that one misses certain qualities. These forms of shame and self-respect, which
Theory and Research in Education 2 (2 )
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are primarily ego-focused, have the function to preserve or to restore the unity
and the integrity of the independent self.
te n s i on s
Now that the main components of our inquiry into whether or not inte-
gration into Dutch society is possible for ethnic minorities while maintaining
their ethno-cultural identity are clarified, we can pose a more specific
question: Can immigrants from collectivistic cultures, more specifically people
who grew up in a Moroccan or Turkish rural village, develop into liberal-
democratic citizens while preserving their interdependent self-concept? We
are inclined to answer this question negatively. There are unmistakably at least
tensions between an interdependent self-concept and good liberal-democratic
citizenship, which make integration into Dutch society by the indicated
minority groups without changing their own identity very difficult or almost
impossible. Here are some of these tensions.
First, dispositions to feel particular other-focused emotions are to a certain
extent incompatible with the full possession of central liberal virtues. Think,
for example, of the affective dispositions that form the seedbed for honor
revenge, a phenomenon that recently got a lot of attention in the Dutch public
media and in research, because of several incidents of murder committed to
save or restore the honor of the family (Maris and Saharso, 2003; Strijbosch,
2001;Van Eck, 2001). In The Netherlands, honor revenge is committed mainly
by members of the Turkish (-Kurd) minority. They believe that the family
honor (namus), the self-respect of the father in particular, is breached by
unchaste behavior of a female member of the family, and that killing the
person who has dishonored her cleanses the honor of the family.4 Honor
revenge is a purification ritual and preferably has to be executed in public and
by daylight. This kind of revenge seems to require an interdependent self-
concept: feelings of honor and dignity are distinctively other-focused,not only
because honor and self-appreciation are highly dependent on the perceived
behavior of the female members, but also because in the end the feeling of
dignity is derived from the honor of the family as a whole. Moreover, their
sense of honor is not quite dependent on the status or worth that those con-
cerned have in their own eyes, but on the judgment of the community.There-
fore, without public knowledge of the dishonorable behavior of the woman
or girl and the associated gossip and slander, male members of the family
might decide not to commit murder to revenge their honor.
Which liberal virtues are incompatible with the indicated affective dispo-
sitions? The most obvious one is the virtue of allegiance to the law of a liberal
democracy, that is, the inner willingness of the liberal citizen to observe the
Spiecker et al.: Self-concept and social integration
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laws and measures that are established and proclaimed on the basis of demo-
cratic rules. Honor revenge conflicts with criminal law that originates from
such a procedure and therefore will be discarded by the liberal citizen as inad-
missible. Additionally, a basic principle of the liberal-democracy is that only
the state has the authority to use violence, and because the liberal citizen will
uphold this principle of monopoly of violence, she will reject any form of
taking the law into one’s own hands, including honor revenge. Of greater
importance, indeed, is the fact that the affective dispositions that motivate
honor revenge are incompatible with the liberal cardinal virtue of respect for
the freedom and rights of fellow citizens to arrange their lives according to
their own values and preferences, as long as the same right of fellow-citizens
is not violated. Honor revenge is related to the reputation of women and that
reputation is tarnished when their behavior conflicts with a set of gender-
specific rules of conduct. These rules seriously restrict their power of decision
and because the rules have not been developed for the well-being of nor sanc-
tioned by women, the rules restrict the freedom of women unjustifiably. In
other words, honor revenge is based on discrimination of women by depriv-
ing them of the right to decide for themselves about very important matters
like sexuality and relations (Maris and Saharso, 2003: 33). The liberal citizen
can only indignantly reject such breaches of the right of self-determination.
One could object that although honor revenge is a practice that presup-
poses an interdependent self-concept, a person with such a self-concept does
not necessarily have the affective dispositions that find their expression in
honor revenge. On the contrary, though there are large groups of ethnic
minorities originating from cultures with strong collectivist tendencies, honor
revenge occurs only sporadically. Nevertheless, and we want to underscore this
point, our description of honor revenge and the associated breach of freedom
and rights point to a much deeper tension between an interdependent self-
concept and liberal citizenship, a tension that seems to be rooted in the self-
interpretation as such. Persons with an interdependent self-concept define
both themselves and others as parts of a larger whole and such a con-
ceptualization seems to be at odds with having the virtue of respect for the
liberal basic rights, which is included in Rawls’ principle of the greatest equal
liberty. The fundamental liberties and political rights that are constitutive for
a liberal democracy are awarded on the basis of the principle of equality to
every adult citizen only because, and exclusively as far as, these citizens are
persons. The virtue of respect for individual basic rights presupposes that the
bearer of this virtue is capable of comprehending herself as well as the other
as a person, and it is highly doubtful if someone with an interdependent self-
concept is able to do so. Not every human being can be understood to be a
person, and therefore as a bearer of freedom rights and political rights. Being
Theory and Research in Education 2 (2 )
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a person roughly presupposes having those qualities that enable us to treat
someone as a responsible being or to award her the status of adulthood, which
implies that she has acquired the qualities and capabilities of practical reason-
ing to take decisions and to attune her behavior to those decisions. If we
consider an individual as a person purely and solely on the basis of such
qualities, and recognize personhood as the only basis for awarding the men-
tioned basic rights, the individual is – as it were – conceived as unattached from
whatever specific embeddedness in relations or social networks.
Of course, collectivist societies also award rights to individuals, but here
rights are regarded foremost as secondary aspects of more fundamental social
norms, positions and relations. In other words the right is not justified by
appeal to the individual qua person, rather it is justified on the basis of their
fulfilling certain duties towards the community, meeting the expectations of
the group, holding a social role or having a certain social status (MacIntyre,
1990: 495–6). These distinctive conceptions of rights correspond to quite
different notions of respect and human dignity. In collectivist cultures, in
which persons conceptualize themselves and each other as interdependent
entities, the dignity of individuals and the respect they deserve is primarily
seen as a function of social norms, roles, positions or interpersonal associations.
For example, someone deserves respect because he is your father, grandfather
or ancestor, or because he has always served the community well. Sometimes
the fact that someone holds an important position or is a member of a higher
caste renders that individual a superior dignity that demands a respectful treat-
ment. In contrast, characteristic for a liberal democracy is that the individual
as such, purely on the basis of the qualities that make her a person and inde-
pendent from any position in any social context, has intrinsic dignity. This
individual intrinsic dignity deserves respect, which is expressed in the liberal
virtue of respect for the rights of fellow man.
The tension between an interdependent self-concept and the respect for
fellow humans can also be described from a more dramatic perspective. The
liberal basic right to arrange one’s life according to one’s own values and
preferences, to the extent that fellow citizens are not hindered in exercising
the same right, implies the freedom to turn – in word and action – against
the ideas and expectations of one’s own community. The exercise of this right
is difficult in a group with a strong collectivist culture, if not virtually imposs-
ible. The pressure of the community on the recalcitrant individual to conform
to the prevailing conventions will be enormous and precisely because this
individual is characterized by an interdependent self-concept, the sanctions of
the group can be felt as extremely threatening. Due to the slight readiness of
the group to accept ideas and behaviors that deviate from their own con-
ventional morality, there is a considerable chance that the affective ties with
Spiecker et al.: Self-concept and social integration
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this individual are severed. And as the individual was taught to define herself
in terms of the group, the imminent loss of such interdependent relations will
threaten and undermine her identity. In other words: even though every
citizen in a liberal democracy has the right to arrange his or her life accord-
ing to his or her own view, minority groups with a collectivist mind-set will
discourage their members to use that right in a variety of ways and the
members themselves will, given their interdependent self-concept, often not
have the proper mental equipment to exercise that right.
The reverse is also true; an interdependent self can easily result in claiming
certain rights for members of one’s own group which are denied to outsiders.
As one’s self is primarily understood in terms of the group to which one
belongs, the distinction between members of the in-group and those of the
out-group is highly relevant for persons with an interdependent self and, con-
sequently, outsiders are often treated and approached in a different way than
the in-group members (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 229, 1994: 118, 120). And
as persons with this self-concept share a common fate with the other group
members, this form of ‘discriminating’ treatment predominantly favors the in-
group members. The interdependent self prioritizes the interests and goals of
the in-group over those of other (ethno-cultural) groups and since preferen-
tial treatment of members of one’s own group serves the interests of the in-
group, favoritism, for example, is not necessarily seen as morally reprehensible.
Therefore, there seems to be an inherent tension between this self-concept and
the political virtue of non-discrimination (or impartial treatment). Favoritism
can also be understood as unconditional solidarity with regard to one’s own
group or community. For a liberal democratic citizen, however, group-
solidarity and loyalty are always conditional. Good liberal-democratic citizen-
ship is compatible with affective attachments to one’s own (ethnic) group, but
in case of a conflict between interests and expectations of the group on the
one hand, and the values and principles of the liberal democracy on the other,
the latter should be overriding. If a liberal citizen does act against these prin-
ciples,5 for instance by appointing a family member instead of a more suitable
candidate, she will realize that she is doing so and acknowledge her wrong-
doing. This attitude is characteristic of what Rawls calls morality of principle
(Rawls,1971: 472). Favoritism on the other hand is typical for a morality of associ-
ation. The modern liberal democracy is not held together by respect for auth-
ority or by feelings of solidarity but by a sense of justice: ‘the citizen body as
a whole is not generally bound together by ties of fellow feelings between indi-
viduals, but by the principles of justice. While every citizen is a friend to some
citizens, no citizen is a friend to all’ (Rawls, 1971: 474).
This section has illustrated that the liberal virtues require an independent
self-concept. However, persons with an independent self-concept are not
Theory and Research in Education 2 (2 )
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necessarily good citizens; it is questionable whether an egoistic person with
an independent self-concept has a disposition to respect the equal rights of
citizens. Nor is a person adhering to a racist ideology averse to discrimination.
So having an independent self is a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient con-
dition for being a good liberal democratic citizen. This self being a necessary
condition raises questions regarding some current reflections on divided
societies and cultural pluralism. Spinner-Halev, for example, argues that the
state should acknowledge its citizens’ nested identities. These nested identities
consist of two parts: a particularistic one, formed by being a member of a
particular community, and a societal one. On our view, obviously, a nested
identity comprising two diverging self-concepts is psychologically unfeasible.
Spinner-Halev’s hope to reduce the tension and fear between groups by
ensuring that people ‘recognize that each community’s identity is important
to many people, that members of each community recognize this fact about
the other, and that each community accepts each other’s legitimate place in
polity’ (Spinner-Halev, 2003: 61) is psychologically realistic only if the
members of the communities have acquired a rather robust independent self-
concept. The same applies to Galston’s plea for liberal pluralism, with its core
virtue of tolerance (2002: 119, 126). According to Galston, a liberal pluralist
society must organize itself around the principle of maximum feasible
accommodation of diverse legitimate ways of life: ‘This principle expresses
(and requires) the practice of tolerance – the conscientious reluctance to act
in ways that impede others from living in accordance with their various con-
ceptions of what gives life meaning and worth’ (2002: 119). The virtue of
tolerance, as we have argued before, can only be an attribute of persons with
an independent self-concept; as indeed many cultural values in our societies
are compatible with this self-concept and its characteristic cognitions,
emotions and motivations only.
conc lu s i on
On the basis of the tensions we have described, we cautiously conclude that
developing into a good citizen in a liberal democracy cannot be combined
with the full preservation of an interdependent self-concept. Can we draw the
more far-reaching conclusion that a liberal-democratic state has to take
measures with the intention to change the interdependent self-concept of
immigrants from collectivist cultures into the direction of an independent self-
concept? It can hardly be denied that citizens with liberal virtues are indis-
pensable for well-functioning liberal-democratic institutions. But does this
functional relationship provide the state the right to see to it that the members
of the younger generation develop into good liberal citizens? And if the state
Spiecker et al.: Self-concept and social integration
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has this right, does the state then also have the duty to exercise that right
against those immigrants who define their self in terms of the group? Or
should the government be content with the development of a modus vivendi,
that is, a situation in which these immigrants accept the rules and principles
of the democratic constitutional state, not out of moral considerations like
respect for the intrinsic dignity of persons, but indeed mainly for reasons of
self- and group interests? Let us discuss these options in turn, beginning with
the least intrusive option.
A modus vivendi was generally accepted or condoned in The Netherlands
with regard to many indigenous religious groups that could be characterized
as collectivistic communities that – and this surely is an understatement – did
not excel in displaying the liberal inclinations (Spiecker and Steutel, 2001).
This could lead to the suggestion that such a societal organization is also well-
suited for the immigrant groups. In our view the modus vivendi option in the
long run forms a threat for the liberal-democratic arrangement of Dutch
society. The main reason for our position is that until about fifty years ago the
vast majority of the Dutch population shared a common or national culture;
citizens of all religious denominations strongly identified with the Christian-
Humanist tradition, shared the same historical narratives and documents, had
collective experiences, and spoke the same language. Therefore, they had
developed common ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Despite differ-
ences in group cultures and religions, the citizens shared – metaphorically
speaking – the ‘same roof ’ (Scheffer, 2000). However, the largest groups of
immigrants brought with them quite different (collectivist and Islamic)
cultures and cannot or do not want to identify with the common Dutch
culture. These groups will form the majority populations of the main Dutch
cities within a few years. Therefore, in our view a modus vivendi regarding these
immigrant groups will not provide sufficiently strong guarantees for the
preservation of a well-functioning democracy.
This brings us to the second option, namely that the state has a right to
promote the development and the establishment of liberal virtues on a large
scale. If a modus vivendi undermines a liberal democracy and if a liberal democ-
racy is valuable, the conclusion follows that the state has the right to try to ensure
that the liberal democracy is sustained. However, nothing is said as yet about the
way in which the state may promote this and if promoting may have a com-
pulsory character. Is the state entitled to oblige all citizens to accept and act
according to the liberal virtues even though this involves a certain loss of one’s
own identity, more in particular the decline of the interdependent self-concept?
This question can be answered from different angles, but we will focus on our
own domain, education. The question then is: does the state have a duty to see
to it that schools provide an education of the liberal virtues to all children?
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We believe that the state has this duty indeed. This does not imply that all
schools become public schools nor that schools with a religious or cultural
identity cannot exist, but it does mean that every school, whatever its charac-
ter, is legally obliged to provide a particular kind and content of education.
However, this duty does have a consequence for an education that stimulates
a development of an interdependent self. An interdependent self results from
an upbringing and education which emphasizes that the child or the pupil
meet the expectations of the in-group or the community and that firmly dis-
courages critical reflection on these expectations. In interdependent child
rearing special attention is given to those circumstances in which the child
does not adjust or behaves improperly; if the child deviates from the expec-
tations of the group members, invariably corrective measures are called for.
On the basis of cross-cultural research Grusec et al. (1977: 275) conclude:
Because interdependence is a central aspect of a child’s sense in collectivist cultures, there
is less need to convince children, through logical arguments, of the importance of ‘taking
in’ pro-social values. Also, because counterarguments are not encouraged or expected,
there is less need to use reasoning or logical arguments’.
In contrast, we believe that compulsory education should stimulate critical
thinking, because the state has the duty to promote the acquisition of liberal
virtues in schools. Thereby the state will ipso facto hamper and discourage the
development of an interdependent self-concept.
Returning to Heine’s notion of self-ways, we want to point to a possible
task of schools and teachers. If we interpret these self-ways from a specific
educational perspective, the (German) notion of Funktionale Erziehung (func-
tional education’) comes to mind, an education, in which parents or other
adults to a great extent are just the executors or instruments of the Objective
Spirit (Hegel), of Absolute Values (Spranger). On a more mundane interpre-
tation this means that teachers and school administrators should reflect on the
question which social practices, school customs, narratives, icons, proverbs, etc.
– which are part of the self-ways – do influence the development of an inde-
pendent self-concept of their pupil (see also De Ruyter and Conroy, 2002).
For, these might be as influential on the development of the pupils as the
official curricular content.
note s
1. The most important rights of that package are the well-known civic liberties
(e.g. the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion), the political basic
rights (e.g. the right to vote and the right to run for office), and the funda-
mental rights that are included in the idea of rule of law (e.g., the right not to
be arrested at will and the right to a fair trial).
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2. This explanation of good citizenship not only is brief, it is also limited. Indeed,
much more than the mentioned political-moral virtues is expected from the
good citizen, but in our view these qualities do form the heart of good liberal
citizenship (Spiecker and Steutel, 1995).
3. Following on what we stated at the end of the former section, one should note
that the notions ‘independent’ and ‘interdependent self ’, just like ‘individualist’
and ‘collectivist cultures’ are not ontological categories but theoretical con-
structs; they are ideal types in the Weberian sense. Therefore, it is a mistake to
identify the psychological categories of independent and the interdependent
self-concepts as respectively an unencumbered and encumbered self. Moreover,
both self-concepts presuppose a metaphysical ‘encumberedness’, for both are
inextricably connected with cultural values.
4. In contrast with The Netherlands, in Turkey honor killing still leads to lower
punishments than is the case with common murders, because of the import-
ance attached to family honor in this predominantly collectivistic culture. For
instance, if the cleansing of honor regards adulterous spouses, the jail sentence
can be reduced to one-eighth of the maximum prison sentence.
5. The idea that no good liberal citizen will ever act against the liberal principles
is of course an ideal.
re f e re nc e s
De Ruyter, D.J. and Conroy, J.C. (2002) ‘The formation of identity: The import-
ance of ideals’, Oxford Review of Education 28(4): 509–22.
Doi, L.T. (1973) The Anatomy of Dependence. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Flanagan, O. (1991) Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Galston, W.A. (2002) Liberal Pluralism.The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political
Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grusec, J.E, Rudy, D. and Martini,T. (1997) ‘Parenting conditions in cross-cultural
perspective’, in J.E. Grusec and L. Kuczynski (eds) Parenting and Children’s Inter-
nalisation of Values. A Handbook of Contemporary Theory. New York: John Wiley
& Sons.
Heine, S.J., Lehman, D.R., Markus, H.R. and Kitayama, S. (1999) ‘Is there a uni-
versal need for positive self-regard?’, Psychological Review 106: 766–94.
Kitayama, S., Markus, H.R. and Matsumoto, H. (1995) ‘Culture, self, and emotion:
A cultural perspective on ‘self-conscious’ emotions’, in J.P. Tangney and K.
Fischer (eds) Self-Conscious Emotions:The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrass-
ment, and Pride. New York/London: The Guilford Press.
Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (1994) ‘Return of the citizen: A survey of recent
work on citizenship theory’, Ethics 104: 352–81.
Kymlicka, W. (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd edn.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1990) ‘Individual and social morality in Japan and the United
States: Rival conceptions of the self ’, Philosophy East & West 40: 489–97.
Maris, C. and Saharso, S. (2003) ‘Eerwraak: cultuur en sekse’ [‘Honor revenge and
gender’], Filosofie & Praktijk 24: 21–36.
Theory and Research in Education 2 (2 )
[ 1 7 4 ]
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012tre.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Markus, H.R. and Kitayama, S. (1991) ‘Culture and the self: implications for cog-
nition, emotion, and motivation’, Psychological Review 98: 224–53.
Markus, H.R. and Kitayama, S. (1994) ‘The cultural construction of self and
emotion: Implications for social behavior’, in S. Kitayama and H.R. Markus
(eds) Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence. Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sandel, M.J. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Scheffer, P. (2000) ‘Het multiculturele drama’ [‘The multi-cultural drama’].
NRC/Handelsblad, 29 January 2002.
Spiecker, B. and Steutel, J. (1995) ‘Political liberalism, civic education and the
Dutch government’, Journal of Moral Education 24: 383–94.
Spiecker,B. and Steutel, J. (2001) ‘Multiculturalism,pillarization and civic education
in the Netherlands’, International Journal of Educational Research 35: 293–304.
Spinner-Halev, J. (2003) ‘Education, reconciliation and nested identities’, Theory
and Research in Education 1(1): 51–72.
Strijbosch, F. (2001) ‘Eerwraak, onderzoek en strafrecht’ [‘Honor revenge, research
and criminal law’], Nederlands Juristenblad 19: 830–90.
Taylor, G. (1985) Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Triandis, H.C. (1990) ‘Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism’, in
R.A. Dienstbier and J.J. Berman (eds) Nebraska Symposion on Motivation 1989:
Cross-cultural Perspectives. Lincoln: University of Nebraska.
Triandis, H.C. (1994) ‘Major cultural syndromes and emotion’, in S. Kitayama and
H.R. Markus (eds) Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence.
Washington, DC:American Psychological Association.
b i og raph i cal  note s
B E N S P I E C K E R is Professor in Philosophy of Education and Head of Depart-
ment of Philosophy and History of Education at the Vrije University Amsterdam.
His main research and teaching interests concern education and emotions, civic
education, sexual ethics.
J A N S T E U T E L is Associate Professor in Philosophy of Education at the Vrije
University Amsterdam. His main research and teaching interests are in the domain
of virtue ethics. Together with Ben Spiecker he has written numerous articles,
among others about education in a liberal democracy, paedophilia and sex amongst
people with a mental disability.
doret  de  ruyte r is Professor in Philosophy of Education at the Vrije Uni-
versity Amsterdam. Her research focuses on questions regarding ideals in edu-
cation. She has written about various topics in the domains of philosophy of
education and youth care.
Correspondence to: Doret J. de Ruyter, Vrije University, Amsterdam, Faculty of
Psychology and Education, Department of Philosophy and History of Education,
Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [e-mail:
dj.de.ruyter@psy.vu.nl]
Spiecker et al.: Self-concept and social integration
[ 1 7 5 ]
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012tre.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
